

ASIRT DECISION

**IN THE MATTER OF AN RCMP SHOOTING IN LAC LA
BICHE ON JULY 27, 2025**

Acting Executive Director: Matthew Block

File No.: 2025-0031(N)

Date of Release: June 24, 2026

Introduction

On July 27, 2025, pursuant to s. 46.1 of the *Police Act*, the Director of Law Enforcement directed the Alberta Serious Incident Response Team (ASIRT) to investigate a Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) fatal shooting that occurred that afternoon. The shooting of the affected person (AP) arose in the context of a call for service involving a male who was causing a disturbance in a residence and had pulled a knife on other occupants. This investigation began prior to the establishment of the Police Review Commission on December 1, 2025, and associated changes to the *Police Act*.

ASIRT designated one subject officer and provided him with notice. ASIRT's investigation is now complete.

ASIRT's Investigation

ASIRT's investigation was comprehensive and thorough, conducted using current investigative protocols, and in accordance with the principles of major case management.

ASIRT investigators interviewed seven civilian witnesses, including the following:

Civilian Witness #1 (CW1) – Original 911 reporter, AP's niece;

Civilian Witness #2 (CW2) – AP's sister;

Civilian Witness #3 (CW3) – AP's mother;

Civilian Witness #4 (CW4) – a neighbour who observed the police interaction with the AP and recorded portions thereof on his cellphone; and

Civilian Witness #5 (CW5) – a neighbour who observed the police interaction with the AP.

ASIRT investigators interviewed three police officers, including the following:

Subject Officer (SO);

Witness Officer #1 (WO1) – Attended the scene alongside the SO and WO2 and was stabbed by the AP in the ensuing police interaction; and

Witness Officer #2 (WO2) – Attended the scene alongside the SO and WO1.

They also obtained the reports and notes of eight additional officers who attended the scene after the shooting.

ASIRT investigators reviewed all available video of the incident, including body worn camera (BWC) footage from three officers, video from three police vehicles (WatchGuard system is equipped with forward-facing and rear-facing cameras), and cellphone videos recorded by CW4.

ASIRT investigators reviewed the originating 911 call and all relevant police radio transmissions from the incident.

ASIRT investigators also oversaw a scene examination conducted by members of the RCMP Forensic Identification Services unit.

Circumstances Surrounding the Incident

On July 27, 2025, at 11:53 a.m., members of the Lac La Biche RCMP were dispatched in response to a 911 call placed by the AP's niece, CW1. CW1 reported that the AP had threatened occupants of their residence with a knife before fleeing from the home while still armed. Although the occupants had secured the residence by locking the AP out, they continued to feel unsafe. CW1 further advised that the AP suffered from schizophrenia, was not taking prescribed medication, and was known to carry knives, including large kitchen knives. It was also reported that the AP had previously threatened to use knives against police if they were contacted.

Officers began arriving on scene at 11:59 a.m. The SO and WO1 spoke with CW1 and CW2 outside their residence for approximately 14 minutes and were later joined by CW3. During these discussions, the witnesses provided background information concerning the AP's mental health, including prior hospitalizations, substance use, a tendency to carry and openly display knives in public, and a pattern of making daily threats towards family members. They also indicated that the AP had previously threatened to stab police officers if they attended the residence. The witnesses expressed a desire for the AP to be apprehended under the *Mental Health Act*, prompting a discussion regarding available options. Based on the information known at that time, WO1 advised that the statutory criteria for apprehension did not appear to be met but indicated that this assessment would be revisited following direct interaction with the AP. During this exchange, CW5 reported observing the AP in a field located behind the residence.

Officers proceeded to the alley behind the residence, which separated the backyard from an open field containing tall grass. After a brief search, the AP emerged from the grass. He was immediately uncooperative, accusing police of attempting to kidnap him.

The AP approached WO1 while brandishing two knives: a long-bladed butcher knife and a shorter metal knife (Figure 1).



Figure 1 - The AP brandished two knives (identified by red arrows) at WO1. Image sourced from: WO1's BWC.

WO1 repeatedly directed the AP to drop the knives so that they could speak with him; however, the AP refused. Throughout this interaction, WO1 continued to advise the AP that officers were present to assist him.

The AP then made statements indicating an intention to take a police vehicle and moved toward the officers. He circled the vehicles parked in the alley, pointing the knives at WO1, who was closest to him (Figure 2).



Figure 2 - The AP pointed a knife at WO1 over the trunk of a parked vehicle, while continuing to hold a second knife (both knives identified by red arrows). WO2 (on left side of image) and the SO adopted triangulated positions vis-a-vis the AP. Image sourced from: SO's BWC.

Despite repeated commands to drop the knives and get on the ground, as well as warnings that he could be charged with assaulting a police officer, the AP remained non-compliant. He made delusional statements, including identifying himself as “the King” and referring to the officers as “deceiver police” because they were not on horseback.

He also yelled “kidnappers” and “help”, while continuing to gesture in a manner consistent with a willingness to use the knives against police. WO1 warned the AP that continued non-compliance could result in the use of a conducted energy weapon (CEW) or other force. The interaction moved into the backyard area, where the AP proceeded through a covered carport while still armed (Figure 3).



Figure 3 - The AP walked towards the carport in the backyard of his residence, while still armed with two knives. Image sourced from: W01 BWC.

WO1 issued a verbal warning – “taser, taser, taser” – and deployed his CEW. The AP was struck and fell backward onto a tarp-covered object within a cluttered carport. As the AP attempted to get up, WO1 advanced in an effort to control him and secure his hands, which continued to grip both knives (Figure 4).



Figure 4 - WO1 tried to gain control of the AP after a successful CEW deployment. The AP continued to hold a knife (identified by red arrow) in his right hand, which was raised and pointed in the direction of WO1. WO1 tried to gain control of that arm. Image sourced from: SO's BWC.

WO1 attempted to gain better control of the AP by straddling him (Figure 5).



Figure 5 - WO1 straddled the AP to try to gain control of him. The SO can be seen on the right side of the image moving in to assist WO1. Image sourced from: WO2's BWC.

The AP continued to resist and managed to destabilize WO1, causing him to fall forward (Figure 6).



Figure 6 - WO1 fell forward, landing above the AP's head. The AP continued to grip both knives in each hand (identified by red arrows). The struggle also caused the SO, who had moved in to assist WO1, to fall backwards. Image sourced from: SO's BWC.

As WO1 attempted to reposition himself, the AP stabbed him in the right thigh. The AP then stood, still holding both knives, and moved quickly toward the SO (Figure 7).



Figure 7 - The AP walked quickly towards the SO brandishing the knives. Image sourced from: SO's BWC.

The SO issued a command, yelling “don’t move!” and discharged his firearm as the AP advanced while still armed and oriented toward W01 (Figure 8).



Figure 8 - While walking towards the SO, still brandishing the knives, the AP looked at W01. The SO fired one shot from his service pistol. W01 can be seen pointing but not firing his CEW. Image sourced from: SO's BWC.

The AP continued advancing. As the SO retreated, he tripped on steps leading into the yard and fell backward. The SO discharged multiple additional rounds over approximately four seconds as the AP continued his approach (Figure 9).



Figure 9 - The AP continued to advance towards the SO, who had fallen backwards over some steps. The SO then fired several more shots. Image sourced from: SO's BWC.

The AP ultimately collapsed near the steps and the SO scrambled backwards to avoid having the AP fall on him (Figure 10).



Figure 70 - After being shot several times, the AP fell to the ground. W01 can be seen getting to his feet in the background. Image sourced from: SO's BWC.

Immediately thereafter, CW3 moved into the area while the SO was calling out, "shots fired," and urged police not to shoot (Figure 11).



Figure 8 - CW3 (identified by yellow arrow) can be seen approaching on the SO's left side immediately after shots were fired. Image sourced from: WO1's BWC.

CW3 positioned herself between the SO and the AP, continuing to address the officers while they attempted to regain composure and coordinate a response, including directing W02 to request emergency medical services (EMS) and provide updates via radio.

During this time, the AP attempted to raise his upper body, while still holding both knives and making audible noises (Figure 12).



Figure 92 - The AP raised his head and upper body off the ground. He was still holding both knives - one which is in the arm tucked under his body and the second (identified by red arrow) in his left hand. Image sourced from: SO's BWC.

The SO repeatedly directed him to, "drop the knife!" while maintaining his firearm at the ready. CW3 was repeatedly instructed to move back

for safety reasons. W01, despite experiencing distress from his injury, prepared his CEW with new cartridges. W02 recognized that W01 had been stabbed, provided additional radio updates, and assisted him to a seated position.

W02 then approached the AP for the purpose of handcuffing and observed that the AP remained in possession of both knives (Figure 13).



Figure 103 - W02 observed that the AP was still holding both knives when she approached to handcuff him. Image sourced from: W02's BWC.

WO2 was nonetheless able to safely disarm the AP and discard the weapons. With the assistance of the SO, WO2 successfully placed the AP in handcuffs behind his back at 12:25 p.m. At that time, the SO was audibly attempting to regulate his breathing. WO2 returned to attend to WO1, while the SO secured the knives to eliminate any ongoing risk. CW3 moved closer to the AP and made physical contact with him, at which point the SO advised that EMS was en route.

At WO1's direction, the SO assessed whether the AP was breathing and initially indicated that he was not. Moments later, however, CW3 addressed the AP and observed a groaning response. WO1 instructed the SO to obtain gloves and initiate first aid. The SO retrieved gloves from his police vehicle, returned, and repositioned the AP onto his back before commencing chest compressions at 12:28 p.m.

EMS arrived at the scene at 12:34 p.m., at which time WO1 directed them to prioritize treatment of the AP. The AP had sustained seven gunshot wounds and was pronounced deceased at the scene.

Autopsy

An Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (OCME) pathologist performed an autopsy on the AP. The AP sustained seven gunshot wounds, five of which penetrated the torso. The pathologist, in her report of January 27, 2026, concluded that the immediate cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds.

Toxicology results showed the AP ingested methamphetamine sometime before death.

Civilian Witnesses

ASIRT investigators interviewed seven civilian witnesses.

CW1, CW2, and CW3 largely reiterated the information they had provided to responding officers upon their initial attendance at the residence. CW1 and CW2 advised that, although they did not directly observe the police interaction with the AP in the backyard, they heard officers repeatedly shouting commands for the AP to, "drop the knife" before hearing a taser deployment and then gunshots. They further indicated that officers continued issuing commands to "drop the knife" even after the gunshots were discharged.

CW3 was present in the backyard at the time of the shooting; however, she reported that she did not have a clear understanding of the sequence of events. She believed that the AP had been both tasered and shot and indicated that he had "reached" one of the officers, believed to be WO1, with a knife. CW3 further stated that while the AP was on the ground, he appeared unable to speak and did not relinquish the knives he was holding despite repeated police directions to do so.

CW4 and his father observed the interaction between police and the AP from a position across the open field where the AP was initially located, at an estimated distance of approximately 80 metres. CW4 recorded portions of the interaction on his cellular phone and subsequently provided this footage to ASIRT investigators. He noted that officers initially adopted a conversational tone when directing the AP to "drop the knife" but that their voices became more raised as the situation progressed and the AP moved into the carport area. CW4 indicated that the AP did not comply with police directions. He reported hearing what he believed to be a CEW deployment, followed by what appeared to be a physical struggle. He then heard an officer shout, "don't move," after which he heard seven or eight gunshots. CW4 also observed an older woman, believed to be CW3, emerge from behind the garage and noted that she appeared to be in close proximity at the time the shots were fired.

CW5 advised that he informed police of the AP's location in the field behind the residence when he encountered them at the property. He observed officers locate the AP, with two officers drawing their service pistols and a third officer equipped with a CEW. The officers directed the AP to get on the ground and drop the knife; however, the AP refused to comply. CW5 observed the AP walk toward the officers while still holding a knife and noted that the officers continued efforts to persuade him to drop the weapon, notwithstanding his view that lethal force might have been used at that stage. The AP then proceeded toward the rear of the residence. Once in the carport, CW5 observed an officer deploy a CEW, causing the AP to fall, after which the officer moved on top of him. CW5's view then became obstructed by a fence, and he did not observe the subsequent stabbing or shooting. He did note that an officer fell backward around the time of the shooting, although he was unable to determine the cause of the fall. CW5 further commented that the officer he believed to have been stabbed had demonstrated patience and calmness in attempting to negotiate with the AP. He also expressed the view that CPR was not initiated for approximately 15 minutes and that it could have been commenced earlier.

Subject Officer

As the subject of a criminal investigation, the SO was entitled to rely on his right to silence and not speak to ASIRT. In this case, he provided ASIRT investigators with a prepared written statement and answered questions in an interview.

The SO advised that he commenced his first posting with the RCMP at the Lac La Biche detachment in December 2024, where he underwent approximately six months of field training under the supervision of a field coach. At the time of the incident, he had been responding to calls independently for approximately one month.

The SO recalled being dispatched to a complaint indicating that the AP had threatened to stab his sister and had departed the residence while still in possession of a knife. Additional information was provided regarding the AP's mental health concerns and his history of non-compliance with police, including prior threats to use knives against responding officers. Upon arrival, the SO and WO1 spoke with CW1, CW2, and CW3, obtaining further details about the AP and the events of that day. They were informed that the AP had been carrying two kitchen knives when he left the residence. CW5 subsequently approached and advised that the AP was located in the back alley.

The SO, WO1, and WO2 proceeded to the alley, where CW5 directed them toward a nearby field. The officers entered the field to locate the AP. WO1 observed the AP and advised that he was holding two knives. WO1 drew his CEW, while WO2 and the SO also drew their service pistols. The officers aimed their respective weapons and issued multiple commands directing the AP to drop the knives; however, he refused to comply. Efforts were made to de-escalate the situation, but the AP did not appear responsive and demonstrated no intention to cooperate.

The AP then moved back toward the residence, repeatedly threatening to advance on the officers with the knives. This required the officers to maintain distance and utilize police vehicles as cover. As the AP continued to approach the residence, WO1 deployed his CEW in an effort to prevent his entry. The AP fell in an area cluttered with debris, which impeded the officers' ability to approach and gain control quickly.

The AP subsequently regained his footing, approached WO1, and attempted to stab him. WO1 seized the AP's hand holding the longer knife, resulting in both individuals falling to the ground. During the

ensuing struggle, the SO observed the AP stab WO1 twice in the leg. At that time, WO1's position placed him with the SO's line of fire, preventing the SO from safely discharging his firearm. In an effort to intervene, the SO struck the AP twice. The AP then stood, still holding both knives, and turned toward the SO while WO1 remained on the ground injured. The SO indicated that he was concerned the AP might re-engage and further harm WO1; however, the AP instead advanced toward him.

The SO further noted that he was positioned in a manner that blocked the AP's only route to the residence, and he was aware that the AP had previously expressed an intention to harm individuals inside. In response, the SO discharged a single shot, providing the AP an opportunity to desist. When the AP continued to advance while armed, the SO discharged two additional shots while retreating. As he continued moving backward, the SO tripped over a step and fell. The AP persisted in advancing, at which point the SO discharged several further rounds. The SO then observed the AP fall and moved quickly to avoid contact as the AP collapsed while still holding the knives.

Following the AP's collapse, the SO stood and issued multiple commands directing the AP to drop the knives; however, there was no response. CW3 approached the area, and the SO directed her to move back for safety reasons. WO2 then approached the AP, removed the knives from his hands, and the SO assisted in placing the AP in handcuffs.

The SO subsequently checked on the condition of the other members and conducted a self-assessment for potential injuries. He retrieved the knives from where WO2 had discarded them on the grass between the residence and the AP and relocated them to a position out of reach of CW3 to mitigate any ongoing safety risk. The SO and WO2 then alternated performing CPR on the AP until EMS arrived.

The SO advised that, in his assessment, there was no viable alternative to the use of lethal force, given the multiple unsuccessful attempts to mitigate the risk posed by the AP, who he perceived as presenting an immediate threat of grievous bodily harm or death to himself, the other officers, and the occupants of the residence.

Witness Officers

ASIRT investigators interviewed two witness officers. The accounts provided by WO1 and WO2 were consistent with the events depicted in their respective BWC footage, which has been summarized above.

WO1 also consented to the release of his medical records in relation to injuries sustained during the incident. The records confirm that WO1 suffered two superficial stab wounds to the left bicep, requiring several sutures to close. He also sustained an additional stab wound to the lower right thigh, measuring approximately two to three centimetres in depth, which required both deep and surface suturing.

Analysis

ASIRT investigates where serious injury or death is caused by a police officer, in addition to other sensitive investigations of police officers. These are criminal investigations only.

Police officers also generally owe a duty of care to individuals in their custody. This includes a legal obligation to provide the "necessaries of life", which includes medical attention required to safeguard a person's health and safety from reasonably foreseeable harm that is more than trivial in nature.

Here, the actions under investigation are the shots fired by the SO that caused the AP's death. ASIRT

also examined whether there was any unreasonable delay in rendering medical aid to the AP following the shooting.

Section 25 Generally

Under s. 25 of the *Criminal Code*, police officers are permitted to use as much force as is necessary for the execution of their duties. Where the force used by an officer is intended or is likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm, s. 25(3) applies and the officer must believe on reasonable grounds that the force is necessary for the self-preservation of the officer or preservation of anyone under that officer's protection. The force used here – discharging a firearm at a person – was clearly intended or likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm. The subject officer therefore must have believed on reasonable grounds that the force he used was necessary for his self-preservation or the preservation of another person under his protection. Another person can include other police officers.

For the defence provided by s. 25 to apply to the actions of an officer, the officer must be required or authorized by law to perform the action in the administration or enforcement of the law, must have acted on reasonable grounds in performing the action, and must not have used unnecessary force.

All uses of force by police must also be proportionate, necessary, and reasonable.

Proportionality requires balancing a use of force with the action to which it responds. As noted above, where force is intended or is likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm, s. 25(3) codifies a requirement that the officer must believe on reasonable grounds that the force is necessary for the self-preservation of the officer or preservation of anyone under that officer's protection.

Necessity requires that there are not reasonable alternatives to the use of force that would also accomplish the same goal. These alternatives can include no action at all. Analysis of police actions must recognize the dynamic situations in which officers often find themselves, and such analysis should not expect police officers to weigh alternatives in real time in the same way they can later be scrutinized in a stress-free environment.

Reasonableness looks at the use of force and the situation as a whole from an objective viewpoint. Police actions are not to be judged on a standard of perfection, but on a standard of reasonableness.

Section 25 Applied

The SO was lawfully placed and acting in the execution of his duties in responding to the call for service involving the AP. The initial information indicated that the AP was armed with a knife and had been threatening others, thereby providing the responding officers with lawful grounds for arrest. In accordance with their core responsibilities to preserve the peace, prevent offences, and safeguard life and public safety, the officers were authorized, and indeed obliged to, apprehend the AP. Their actions throughout the incident were undertaken in furtherance of these duties.

The officers' BWC footage captures the entirety of the incident and provides a reliable and determinative account of events. The AP's behaviour escalated immediately upon police engagement. He persistently brandished two knives at officers and refused repeated commands to drop the weapons. He then began advancing toward an occupied residence. In these circumstances, it was objectively reasonable for the officers to fear for their own safety, the safety of their colleagues, and that of the occupants of the residence.

WO1 was justified in deploying his CEW in an effort to prevent the AP from entering the residence. His subsequent attempt to disarm and restrain the AP proved unsuccessful due to the AP's active

resistance while wielding a knife in each hand. The struggle occurred on uneven and cluttered terrain, contributing to WO1's loss of balance and control. The AP immediately exploited this loss of control and stabbed WO1.

In these circumstances, the SO's decision to discharge his firearm was reasonable. The act of brandishing knives alone presents an immediate threat to life; in this case, the risk was further elevated by the AP's demonstrated willingness to use those weapons, as evidenced by the stabbing of WO1.

It was necessary for the SO to fire at the AP when he did. The AP posed an immediate and potentially lethal threat, having refused to comply with repeated police commands and having advanced towards officers while armed with two knives. Even following the deployment of the CEW, the AP continued to resist, retained control of the weapons, and inflicted injury on WO1. In light of these circumstances, no lesser use of force options were reasonably available to the SO.

The SO's use of his firearm to shoot the AP was also proportionate to the threat of death or grievous bodily harm that he reasonably appeared to pose to the SO, WO1, and nearby civilians.

The SO was required or authorized by law to act that day and acted on reasonable grounds. His use of force was reasonable, proportionate, and necessary. As a result, the defence provided by s. 25 of the *Criminal Code* is likely to apply to the SO.

Section 34 Generally

A police officer also has the same protections for the defence of person under s. 34 of the Criminal Code as any other person. This section provides that a person does not commit an offence if they believe on reasonable grounds that force is being used or threatened against them or another person, if they act to defend themselves or another person from this force or threat, and if the act is reasonable in the circumstances. For the act to be reasonable in the circumstances, the relevant circumstances of the individuals involved, and the act must be considered. Section 34(2) provides a non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered to determine if the act was reasonable in the circumstances:

- (a) the nature of the force or threat;
- (b) the extent to which the use of force was imminent and whether there were other means available to respond to the potential use of force;
- (c) the person's role in the incident;
- (d) whether any party to the incident used or threatened to use a weapon;
- (e) the size, age, gender and physical capabilities of the parties to the incident;
- (f) the nature, duration and history of any relationship between the parties to the incident, including any prior use or threat of force and the nature of that force or threat;
 - (f.1) any history of interaction or communication between the parties to the incident;
- (g) the nature and proportionality of the person's response to the use or threat of force; and
- (h) whether the act committed was in response to a use or threat of force that the person knew was lawful.

The analysis under s. 34 for the actions of a police officer often overlaps considerably with the

analysis of the same actions under s. 25.

Section 34 Applied

As noted above, this incident involved a reasonable police action.

Based on the evidence, there is no reasonable interpretation other than that the SO was acting to defend himself and WO1 when he fired at the AP.

There were no other means available to the SO to respond to the threat of grievous bodily harm or death presented by the AP. As such, the defence under s. 34 of the *Criminal Code* is likely to apply to the SO.

Duty of Care

Police officers and other officials generally owe a duty of care to individuals in their custody. Where a person in custody experiences medical distress, criminal liability may arise if the individual responsible fails to exercise reasonable care. Potential offences include failing to provide the necessaries of life.

Failing to provide the necessaries of life requires an assessment of whether there has been a marked departure from the standard of conduct expected of a reasonably prudent person in comparable circumstances. Necessaries of life can include many aspects such as the provision of appropriate medical care. It must also be objectively foreseeable that a failure to provide such care would expose the person in custody to a risk of danger to the life, or permanent endangerment to the health. The standard is not one of perfection, and mere errors in judgment will not attract criminal liability unless they amount to a marked departure from the relevant standard.

In this case, there is no evidence to support a finding that this duty was breached to the requisite criminal standard.

Approximately six minutes elapsed between the discharge of the final shot by the SO and the initiation of CPR on the AP. During the first three minutes of that interval, the AP remained armed, refused repeated commands to drop the knives, and initially appeared to be attempting to rise from the ground. He continued to move his head and make audible sounds after settling back, leaving uncertainty as to his capacity to continue using the weapons. Additionally, the presence of CW3, who was actively engaging with the AP and creating a distraction, heightened the safety risk posed by the still-armed AP. In these circumstances, it was not safe for officers to commence CPR until the AP had been disarmed and placed in handcuffs, which occurred approximately three minutes after the final shot.

During the subsequent 90 seconds, the SO appeared visibly distressed, as evidenced by his need to regulate his breathing. Within that period, he also checked on the wellbeing of fellow officers and retrieved the knives that had been discarded by WO2 to ensure that they no longer posed a safety risk, particularly given CW3's continued proximity. At the same time, WO2 was engaged in providing updates over the police radio, including requesting EMS and assisting WO1.

Once WO1 had stabilized himself and was applying pressure to his injuries, he directed the SO to assess the AP's condition. At that time, CW3 was positioned beside the AP, physically interacting with him and speaking to him. The AP could be heard making groaning sounds in response. Following this, WO1 instructed the SO to obtain nitrile gloves and begin administering CPR, notwithstanding the SO's initial assessment that the AP was not breathing. The SO retrieved gloves from his vehicle, returned promptly, repositioned the AP onto his back, and commenced CPR.

In these circumstances, the approximately three-minute interval between the AP being handcuffed and the initiation of resuscitation efforts does not amount to a marked departure from the applicable standard of care. Rather, the delay is reasonably attributable to the SO's relative inexperience – having been operational for only approximately seven months – as well as the highly dynamic and chaotic nature of the scene. The SO had just discharged his firearm, witnessed a fellow officer being stabbed, and was required to manage ongoing safety concerns, including the presence of a civilian in close proximity. It would be unreasonable to expect a more immediate response under these conditions.

There is no evidence to suggest that any delay in the initiation of medical assistance contributed to the AP's death.

Conclusion

The SO's use of force was proportionate, necessary, and reasonable. The delay in administering medical aid was also reasonable in the circumstances. As a result, there are no reasonable grounds to believe that an offence was committed.

Original Signed

Matthew Block

Acting Executive Director

June 24, 2026

Date of Release